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“SO FAR AS WAR ALLOWS”: 
WHY THE AL MAHDI CONVICTION IS UNLIKELY TO 
STEM THE PACE OF CULTURAL DESTRUCTION 
PERPETRATED BY NON-STATE ACTORS 
 
Jessica E. Burrus† 
 
Abstract:   In September of 2016, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi was convicted in the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) for the intentional destruction of several World 
Heritage sites during the 2012 conflict in Timbuktu, Mali.  This conviction was hailed as a 
breakthrough after years of frustration with the lack of enforcement of international laws 
prohibiting the destruction of cultural property.  It was also the first conviction of its kind, 
and advocates of cultural preservation have celebrated it as a much-needed general 
deterrent in North Africa and the Middle East, where iconoclasm has become a favorite 
tactic of various state and non-state actors in armed conflict.  However, the Al Mahdi trial 
may in fact be the exception that proves the untenability of the legal regime protecting 
cultural heritage sites.  Current treaty law protecting immovable cultural property reflects 
an increasingly outdated philosophical and historical narrative that is directly contradicted 
by the ideologies of the groups that most often threaten World Heritage sites.  As long as 
the protection of cultural property remains more closely associated with a state’s sovereign 
responsibility to protect physical buildings, as opposed to the international community’s 
willingness to protect the people who hold those buildings dear, the effective prevention of 
the destruction of cultural heritage will remain out of reach. 
 
Cite as: Jessica E. Burrus, “So Far as War Allows”: Why the Al Mahdi Conviction is 
Unlikely to Stem the Pace of Cultural Destruction Perpetrated by Non-State Actors, 27 
WASH. INT’L L.J. 317 (2017). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great 
deal to our cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments 
which by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate 
the growth of the civilization which is ours.  We are bound to 
respect those monuments so far as war allows.1 
 
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s instructions to the Allied troops 
fighting in Italy during World War II demonstrate the nascent foundational 
presumptions of his generation that influenced twentieth-century international 
lawmaking on the preservation of cultural property.  In the excerpt above, 
                                                 
† J.D. candidate, University of Washington School of Law, class of 2018. The author would like to 
thank Professor Adam Eisenberg and Professor M.J. Durkee for their support and advice throughout the 
comment-writing process. 
1 Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, to All 
Commanders (Dec. 29, 1943) (emphasis added), https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2014/02/10/ 
general-dwight-d-eisenhower-and-the-protection-of-cultural-property/. 
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which is the opening paragraph of his letter, Eisenhower firmly established 
that the military in wartime had a duty of stewardship—if not co-ownership—
of the cultural property surrounding them in Italy. His statements rely on a 
notion of collective responsibility: Italy’s monuments are emblematic of “our” 
civilization, and “we” are their cultural heirs. That said, the same letter takes 
an equally firm stance on the necessity to protect bodies before buildings, 
stating that however valuable that cultural property may be, “our men’s lives 
count infinitely more.”2 
 
The nature, extent, and even the existence of this “sacred duty”3 to 
protect cultural property face unique challenges in the twenty-first century. A 
pattern of iconoclasm4 has accompanied the rise of militant religious state- 
and non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East, often committed in 
defiance of the international community.5  The current legal regime protecting 
cultural property remains particularly ill-suited for conflicts with and among 
non-state actors6 who define themselves in religious, racial, and ideological 
terms.  This same structure has hindered the recognition of the rights of 
indigenous peoples and minority groups, and many monuments and sites 
                                                 
2 Id. 
3 Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation pmbl., Nov. 
16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter UNESCO Constitution], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
UNTS/Volume%204/volume-4-I-52-English.pdf (“[T]he wide diffusion of culture, . . . education . . . and 
peace are indispensable . . . and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill . . . .”). 
4 “Iconoclasm” will be used in this Comment to identify “the rejection or destruction of religious 
images as heretical.” Iconoclasm, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015). 
5 See, e.g., Kevin D. Kornegay, Destroying the Shrines of Unbelievers: The Challenge of Iconoclasm 
to the International Framework for the Protection of Cultural Property, 221 MIL. L. REV. 153, 154 (2014) 
(“[T]he destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas was also a statement of defiance of the international community, 
which had lobbied strenuously for their preservation”); Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The 
Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 620 (2003) (“[T]o 
the knowledge of the authors, this episode [the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas] is the first planned and 
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of great importance as act of defiance of the United Nations and of 
the international community.”). 
6 This Comment will rely on Andrew Clapham’s expansive definition of “non-state actor” as 
“including any entity that is not actually a state, often used to refer to armed groups, terrorists, civil society, 
religious groups, or corporations,” recognizing that the international community itself and the United 
Nations, as an intergovernmental organization, may also be described as “non-state actors.” Andrew 
Clapham, Non-State Actors, in POSTCONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A LEXICON 200–02 (Vincent Chetail ed., 
2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1339810. 
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designated for international protection face an unprecedented threat of 
destruction as groups vie for cultural dominance.7 
 
The International Criminal Court’s (“ICC”) ability to prosecute cultural 
destruction as a war crime is considered an important deterrent against 
iconoclastic tactics,8 but until recently it had never been wielded.9 That all 
changed on September 27, 2016, when the ICC sentenced Ahmad Al Faqi Al 
Mahdi to nine years of imprisonment for his role in the destruction of nine 
mausoleums10 and the door of a mosque in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012,11 all of 
which were United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”) World Heritage sites.12  Al Mahdi was a member of Ansar Dine, 
                                                 
7 See May Yaacoub & Karim Hendili, Cultural Sites in the Middle East Face “Unprecedented” 
Destruction, UNITED NATIONS RADIO (Dec. 15, 2016), 
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2016/12/cultural-sites-in-the-middle-east-face-unprecedented-
destruction/. It should be noted that recent progress has been made in the form of, for example, new 
protections for intangible cultural property. See, e.g., Francesco Francioni, The Human Dimension of 
International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 14 (2011) (“States remain the 
contracting parties to the [Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage] but the 
substantive addressees are the cultural communities and human groups, including minorities, whose cultural 
traditions are the real object of the safeguarding under international law.”). 
8 Jason Burke, ICC Ruling for Timbuktu Destruction ‘Should Be Deterrent for Others’, GUARDIAN, 
Sept. 27, 2016, 6:25 AM, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/27/timbuktu-shrines-icc-sentences-
islamic-militant-nine-years-destruction-ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi. 
9 Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against Property or a Crime 
Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 387 (2016). 
10 These were: “1) the mausoleum Sidi Mahamoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit, 2) the mausoleum 
Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani, 3) the mausoleum Sheikh Sidi Mokhtar Ben Sidi Muhammad Ben 
Sheikh Alkabir, 4) the mausoleum Alpha Moya, 5) the mausoleum Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi, 
6) the mausoleum Sheikh Muhammad El Mikki, 7) the mausoleum Sheikh Abdoul Kassim Attouaty, 8) the 
mausoleum Ahmed Fulane, and 9) the mausoleum Bahaber Babadié . . . .” Case Information Sheet, Int’l 
Criminal Court [ICC], Situation in the Republic of Mali: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Aug. 
24, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AlMahdiEng.pdf. 
11 Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 38(viii) (Sept. 27, 
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.pdf. 
12 “World Heritage” is the UNESCO “designation for places on Earth that are of outstanding universal 
value to humanity and as such, have been inscribed on the World Heritage List to be protected . . . .” FAQ: 
What Is World Heritage?, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/faq/19 (last updated Feb. 10, 2017). Countries 
that have signed the World Heritage Convention may inscribe sites on the list. See The Criteria for Selection, 
UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). Sites must meet certain criteria for 
selection to qualify for inclusion. Id. Though not a prerequisite for prosecution upon destruction, the high 
profile of UNESCO World Heritage sites can help to draw attention to the fact that a deliberate cultural attack 
has been made. For example, judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) have explicitly referred to the status of cultural sites as UNESCO World Heritage sites in 
emphasizing the gravity of criminal acts of destruction. See Micaela Frulli, The Criminalization of Offences 
Against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The Quest for Consistency, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 203, 
209 (2011). 
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an Islamist group that took the city and sought to begin enforcing its members’ 
interpretation of Islamic law by destroying sites they considered idolatrous.13  
 
In the words of UNESCO in the wake of the Al Mahdi conviction, 
cultural destruction is used “to destroy people as well as the monuments 
bearing their identities, institutions of knowledge and free thought.”14  
However, as noted in the decision, Al Mahdi was “not charged with crimes 
against persons but with a crime against property.”15  Furthermore, “even if 
inherently grave, crimes against property are generally of lesser gravity than 
crimes against persons.”16  Even during the flurry of international cooperation 
on this subject following World War II, “cultural property . . . was not 
protected under the Geneva Conventions, likely because cultural heritage 
destruction was not considered to be as serious as other war crimes.”17  It 
should also be noted that in Timbuktu, Al Mahdi’s destruction of religious 
monuments pales in comparison to the human rights abuses observers 
documented during the 2012 conflict in Mali.18  These abuses include 
extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, torture, floggings, and 
amputations.19 
 
The trial and conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for the crime of 
cultural destruction is remarkable because it was the first of its kind in several 
ways.20  He was the first ICC defendant to enter a plea of guilty, the first 
                                                 
13 See Mali Crisis: Key Players, BBC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
17582909/. 
14 Camila Domonoske, For First Time, Destruction of Cultural Sites Leads to War Crime Conviction, 
NAT’L PUB. RADIO, Sept. 27, 2016, 9:33 AM, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/ 
09/27/495606932/for-first-time-destruction-of-cultural-sites-leads-to-war-crime-conviction/. 
15 Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ¶ 77. There is, however, evidence that Al Mahdi was at least 
complicit in other crimes against the citizens of Timbuktu. See Marlise Simons, Extremist Pleads Guilty in 
Hague Court to Destroying Cultural Sites in Timbuktu, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/world/europe/ahmed-al-mahdi-hague-trial.html; see also discussion 
infra Sections III.B, III.C. For more on human rights groups accusing Al Mahdi of war crimes against 
persons, see Malian Jihadist Pleads Guilty to Timbuktu Shrine Destruction in Historic Trial, FRANCE 24, 
Aug. 22, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160822-mali-icc-justice-timbuktu-jihadist-cultural-heritage-
destruction/. 
16 Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ¶ 77. Some have speculated that a similar philosophy is evident 
in the Statute of the ICTY: “[G]iven the massive scale of crimes being perpetrated against people and the 
ensuing irreparable loss of human life, the protection of a certain kind of property per se was not considered 
a priority.” Frulli, supra note 12, at 208. 
17 Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 344. 
18 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLLAPSE, CONFLICT AND ATROCITY IN MALI: HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH REPORTING ON THE 2012–13 ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS AFTERMATH 4 (2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/mali0514_ForUpload.pdf. 
19 Id. 
20 See Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ¶ 13. 
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defendant to be convicted of cultural destruction as a war crime before the 
ICC, and the first jihadist ICC defendant.21  As such, the international 
community, and particularly those organizations charged with safeguarding 
the cultural property that groups like Ansar Dine have targeted in recent years, 
were quick to applaud his being brought to justice in an international tribunal.  
Despite the vocal international condemnation of cultural destruction during 
armed conflict, civil unrest, and revolution in the Middle East and North 
Africa,22 until September 2016, the ICC had never before been presented with 
an opportunity to prosecute a war criminal accused of the destruction of 
cultural property.23  Indeed, prior to this prosecution, the notion seemed 
fanciful at best due to the international courts’ lack of jurisdiction in the 
countries most at risk, including Iraq and Syria.24  As one journalist summed 
up the situation, “[B]eyond scolding the Islamists of the Sahel, there’s little 
anyone can do to stop this wretched bout of iconoclasm.  History is littered 
with the debris of toppled temples and smashed idols.”25  Another scholar 
remarked in 2007, “[I]t is difficult to imagine that states or international 
organizations like the International Criminal Court would devote significant 
resources to prosecuting looters and traders if violations of treaties were 
treated as international crimes, as many scholars advocate.”26  There is hope 
that the conviction “could help persuade other nations to pursue similar 
charges relating to Syria and Iraq, where no international court has yet 
jurisdiction,”27 and where international efforts to preserve World Heritage 
sites have fallen on deaf ears.28  This hope may be rooted in the notion that 
highly visible convictions like Al Mahdi’s help establish the prohibition of 
                                                 
21 Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, the Scholar and Enforcer of Timbuktu, NATIONAL (Aug. 19, 2016, 4:00 
AM) [hereinafter Scholar and Enforcer], https://www.thenational.ae/world/ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-the-
scholar-and-enforcer-of-timbuktu-1.138823. 
22 “The failure of international law to protect the remains of the past has been glaringly and painfully 
obvious, as foreign governments, international organizations including UNESCO and the United Nations, 
and a multitude of private nongovernmental cultural organizations have issued countless statements 
condemning the destruction.” Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 337. 
23 Domonoske, supra note 14. 
24 Simons, supra note 15. 
25 Ishaan Tharoor, Timbuktu’s Destruction: Why Islamists Are Wrecking Mali’s Cultural Heritage, 
TIME, July 2, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wrecking-
malis-cultural-heritage/. To clarify, “the Sahel” is derived from an Arabic word meaning “shore,” and it refers 
to the region of North Africa south of the Sahara from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. Noah Butler, Sahel, 
OXFORD REFERENCE, http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195176322 
.001.0001/acref-9780195176322-e-1380 (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
26 Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations, 8 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 219–20 (2007). 
27 Simons, supra note 15. 
28 For example, United Nations and Arab League officials in 2014 pleaded for a halt to the cultural 
destruction in Syria. See ‘Stop the Destruction’, UN Officials Urge in Plea to Save Syria’s Cultural Heritage, 
UN NEWS CENTRE, Mar. 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47340. 
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cultural destruction as customary international law that may be enforced 
against non-state actors.29 
 
Although international law prohibiting cultural destruction has finally 
yielded a tangible result, that result stands alone atop a growing pile of ancient 
rubble, and “in the realm of cultural heritage, the paucity of such prosecutions 
mean that it is very much open to question whether these legal provisions 
provide any actual deterrence to the commission of these violations.”30  For 
this reason, it is important to assess the specific conditions of the Mali 
situation, as well as whether they bode well for the future of cultural 
preservation.  Despite the well-earned and earnest words from UNESCO 
representatives upon the conviction of Al Mahdi, their predictions about the 
trial’s potential deterrent effect on the way state and non-state actors wage war 
are unlikely to come true. 
 
When it comes to the protection of humanity’s irreplaceable cultural 
property, rhetorical commitment to the cause often far exceeds the legal 
protections that the international community can agree to adopt.31  This 
regulatory reticence may be rooted in a basic rejection of the concept of 
international ownership of cultural heritage because of the challenge it 
presents to national ownership and sovereign decision-making. 
 
In many ways, international laws protecting the world’s cultural 
heritage can be seen as “imposing obligations on nations to care for the 
cultural property located within their borders and to safeguard both their own 
and their adversaries’ cultural property during warfare.”32  Depending on 
cultural context, the nature of a given conflict, and available resources, that 
imposition may be culturally unwelcome or practically impossible to achieve.  
Without making it clear that the destruction of heritage sites comprises war 
crimes, the international community risks exacerbating the impulse to destroy 
these sites because it appears to reward victors and punish the defeated on the 
basis of ideological allegiances. 
 
In Part I, this Comment examined whether the Al Mahdi decision 
represents a new chapter in the international treaty regime that recognizes and 
                                                 
29 Francesco Francioni points to this hope in his discussion of the prosecution for the intentional 
destruction of the Stela of Matara by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. Francioni, supra note 7, at 
13. 
30 Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 352. 
31 See, e.g., Frulli, supra note 12, at 205–06. 
32 Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 348. 
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discourages cultural destruction, or if future generations will look back on it 
as an ultimately ineffective stab at preventing property-based war crimes.  Part 
II explores critical elements of the modern international legal regime 
protecting cultural property, with a particular focus on the underlying policies 
of ownership and stewardship.  It also discusses the roots of that regime, 
which includes the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property 
in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the 
Convention (“1954 Hague Convention”), the 1972 UNESCO Convention for 
the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage (“World Heritage 
Convention”), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(“Rome Statute”).  Part III traces the 2012 conflict in Mali and analyzes the 
Al Mahdi trial and conviction with a brief explanation of the 2012–2013 
conflict in Mali and the ascendance of Ansar Dine in Timbuktu.  It also 
includes a description of the nature of the cultural property that was destroyed 
in Mali, and an account of the destruction of the cultural heritage sites of 
Timbuktu. 
 
The Al Mahdi conviction represents a rare moment when a destroyer of 
cultural heritage was brought to justice.  However, as the following analysis 
reveals, it is unlikely to have an impact on the future of the preservation of 
cultural heritage beyond Mali because the current threat to cultural property 
posed by non-state actors defies the foundational presumptions of our current 
treaty regime. 
 
II. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY REGIME PROTECTING 
IMMOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING ARMED CONFLICT 
 
The recent enforcement of international law protecting cultural heritage 
in Mali was possible because of the country’s membership in key organs of 
international law as well as its ratification of several important conventions 
on the subject.  International and national laws restricting the destruction of 
cultural property during conflict have deep roots and are closely related to 
general rules governing armed conflict.  However, for the purposes of 
analyzing the Al Mahdi conviction, this section will focus on post-World War 
II international conventions to which Mali is a party. 
 
Before delving into the contours of international law which led to Al 
Mahdi’s conviction, it is important to question why the law protects cultural 
property in the first place.  In international criminal law, the crime of cultural 
destruction is not characterized as a form of genocide, although one could 
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characterize the motivations of those who perpetrate cultural destruction as 
genocidal.33  Despite the passionate reasoning of Rafael Lemkin, an architect 
of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, a provision including cultural destruction as a form of genocide 
was not included in the final form of that convention.34  As prominent legal 
scholar Patty Gerstenblith has noted, this exclusion partially accounts for the 
ineffective enforcement of the laws against cultural destruction.  Arguably, 
the international emphasis on the protection of physical monuments, as 
opposed to intangible cultural heritage or practices, can be traced back to this 
exclusion.35  Notably, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has analyzed the connection between war crimes of 
persecution by way of cultural destruction and genocide,36 “finding . . . that 
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage . . . may constitute evidence of the 
element of mens rea required for the commission of the crime of genocide.”37 
 
That said, cultural destruction is most often characterized as a war 
crime and can be prosecuted under domestic law as violative of several 
international conventions.  Most importantly for the purposes of the situation 
in Mali, in the absence of adequate domestic law, cultural destruction can also 
be prosecuted under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the 
violation of which led to the arrest of Al Mahdi. 
 
A. Early Roots of Cultural Property Protection 
 
General Eisenhower was not the first American to remind soldiers of 
their obligation to prevent the avoidable destruction of immoveable cultural 
property.  In 1863, United States President Abraham Lincoln commissioned 
the Lieber Code, designed by Francis Lieber to be a “work for mankind of 
historic effect and permanency.”38  It specified that “churches, . . . 
establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge, 
                                                 
33 Id. at 342–44. 
34 Id. at 343. 
35 Id. at 343–44. 
36 “While the parallel between persecution and genocide has the advantage of attaching symbolic value 
to the protection of cultural property, it also brings the problem of the high threshold for the presentation of 
evidence . . . .” Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict: The Practice of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 28 (2001); see also 
Frulli, supra note 12, at 207–08 (discussing the differences between proposed and final definitions of cultural 
property in Article 3(d) of the Statute of the ICTY). 
37 Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared 
Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209, 1218 (2004). 
38 Jordan J. Paust, Dr. Francis Lieber and the Lieber Code, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 112, 112 
(2001). 
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. . . [and] museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character . . . [were] not 
to be considered public property” that could be seized by a victorious army,39 
and that “art, libraries, scientific collection, or precious instruments . . . must 
be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in 
fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.”40  It is widely acknowledged41 
as “the first codification of the obligation to safeguard cultural sites and 
objects during war”42—an obligation that arguably dates back to the Romans 
whose temples are now the subjects of that protection.43  The Union and the 
Confederacy, locked in combat, also struggled to define the nature of their 
conflict—whether it was fundamentally civil or international—and 
consequently, the rules of engagement applicable to the war.44  The Lieber 
Code provided much-needed guidelines while tabling, for the moment, this 
fundamental question, and its precursor was distributed amongst Union 
soldiers as a pamphlet to ensure they received the message.45  Even so, the 
Lieber Code made generous allowances for derogation in deference to 
military strategy, and General Sherman’s “March to the Sea” arguably 
violated many of the civilian protections contained therein.46 
 
The history of cultural property protection in armed conflict can seem 
like a litany of commitments and betrayals, even by states with a reputation 
for the conscientious observance of the rules of war.  Building on the Lieber 
Code and the Brussels Declaration of 1874,47 formal international legal 
protection of immoveable cultural property48 during war was, for the most 
                                                 
39 The Lieber Code of 1863, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the 
Field, Series III, Vol. 3, sec. 124, General Orders No. 100, art. 34 (Apr. 24, 1863), 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp. 
40 Id. art. 35. The Lieber Code notably touches on both wartime plunder and cultural destruction. This 
Comment notes the important distinction between the two and will focus only on the latter. 
41 Kornegay, supra note 5, at 161 (“[I]t is not an exaggeration to say that the Lieber Code’s provisions 
for protection of cultural property were the progenitors of the entire framework of protections for cultural 
property that now exist under international law.”). 
42 Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural Heritage 
at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 245, 254 (2006). 
43 “[I]n his prosecution, in 70 B.C., of Gaius Verres . . . . Cicero distinguished between ordinary war 
booty (spolia), which a conqueror was free to take, and illegal removal of art and architectural decoration 
(spoliatio).” Id. at 250. 
44 See Patryk I. Labuda, Lieber Code, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/ 
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2126 (last updated Sept. 2014). 
45 Paust, supra note 38, at 113. 
46 Labuda, supra note 44. 
47 See, e.g., Laws and Treaties Protecting Cultural Property: The Lieber Code of 1863, U.S. 
COMMITTEE BLUE SHIELD, http://uscbs.org/1863-lieber-code.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
48 Though the exact parameters of what cultural property is are drawn differently in different 
conventions, see discussion infra Sections II.B–D, this Comment will use the term “immovable cultural 
property” as it is used by UNESCO, meaning “tangible cultural heritage” such as “monuments, 
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part, a child of the twentieth century—only a little younger than Eisenhower 
himself—maturing particularly rapidly after World War II49 in an 
international community still reeling from the widespread destruction50 that 
Eisenhower sought to palliate.  After all, during World War II the Allied 
troops in Italy destroyed an ancient Benedictine Abbey on a hilltop called 
Monte Cassino on February 15, 1944, just forty-eight days after Eisenhower 
penned his letter discouraging cultural destruction.51  The bombing of the 
abbey resulted in the complete annihilation of the building and the deaths of 
countless civilians sheltering inside, but it was ultimately deemed a military 
failure because the Allied forces had to fight on for three more months before 
the hill was captured.52  Disasters like Monte Cassino paved the way for a 
reevaluation of wartime cultural heritage protection even before the war 
ended.53 
 
B. The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution 
of the Convention, Also Known as the 1954 Hague Convention 
 
The 1954 Hague Convention was “the first international convention to 
address exclusively the subject of cultural property,”54 and some have argued 
that the specificity with which cultural destruction has been addressed by 
international law—what with its own particular conventions and all—
provides an important insight into the weakness with which these laws have 
been enforced.55  Mali ratified the 1954 Hague Convention on May 18, 1961.56 
                                                 
archaeological sites, and so on.” What Is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”?, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/unesco-database-of-
national-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-asked-questions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/ (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2017). 
49 See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 14 (Sept. 27, 
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.pdf. 
50 See Gerstenblith, supra note 42, at 258 (“The largest destruction and displacement of cultural sites 
and objects known to human history occurred during World War II.”). 
51 Nobuo Hayashi, Contextualizing Military Necessity, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 189, 196–97 (2013). 
52 Id. at 197–98. 
53 See id. at 198–99. 
54 Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 346. 
55 Id. at 347. Gerstenblith particularly highlights the ongoing distinction between civilian property and 
cultural property in times of war as a peculiarity of international law that “has reduced, rather than enhanced, 
the level of protection given to cultural property,” insofar as it serves to further separate crimes against 
civilian bodies and civilian practices from crimes against crimes against immovable cultural property, placing 
the former much higher than the latter on a sort of conceptual list of priorities in the identification and 
prosecution of war crimes. Id. 
56 Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries: Mali, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=ML. 
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A key feature of the 1954 Hague Convention is that it actually defines 
cultural property, and it represents the first use of the expression “cultural 
property” in this context.  Earlier instruments relied on “an empirical 
indication of objects of historical, monumental or humanitarian interest,”57 but 
the 1954 Hague Convention defines cultural property as, inter alia: 
 
[M]ovable or immovable property of great importance to the 
cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of 
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; 
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are 
of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books 
and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; 
as well as scientific collections and important collections of 
books . . . .58 
 
The 1954 Hague Convention is notable for its reliance on the term “people” 
rather than “nation” or “state” as a basic societal group unit, emphasizing in 
its preamble that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people 
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each 
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.”59  This emphasis 
carries the promise of protection for minority groups or displaced groups 
facing persecution from intrastate conflicts, as opposed to solely international 
conflicts.  One scholar casts this emphasis on “people” as a “connection to 
human rights and [a] foreshadow[ing of] the idea of an integral obligation 
owed to the international community as a whole (erga omnes) rather than to 
individual states on a contractual basis.”60  From this perspective, the 1954 
Hague Convention can be seen as an expression of a set of international 
norms, a perspective that often leads to the belief that customary international 
                                                 
57 Francioni, supra note 7, at 10 n.6. 
58 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations 
for the Execution of the Convention art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague 
Convention], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20249/volume-249-I-3511-
English.pdf. 
59 Id. pmbl. (emphasis added). 
60 Francioni, supra note 7, at 13. 
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law61 could serve as an avenue for the prosecution of the destruction of 
cultural property even when the groups in conflict are not parties to the 1954 
Hague Convention.62 
 
This promise of protection for peoples and not merely states is, 
however, complicated by phraseology elsewhere in the 1954 Hague 
Convention which appears to restrict its obligations on contracting parties to 
conflicts similar in nature to World War II—that is, international conflicts 
involving ground invasions and foreign occupations.  Take, for example, the 
duty described in Article 5: “Any High Contracting Party in occupation of the 
whole or part of the territory of another High Contracting Party shall as far as 
possible support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in 
safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.”63  Article 5’s implicit 
conceptual basis in a situation involving one foreign power invading and 
occupying territory within the borders of another foreign power seems 
decidedly inapplicable to the type of occupation Ansar Dine witnessed in 
Mali. 
 
The qualification that cultural property be “of great importance to the 
cultural heritage of every people” implies that cultural property is that which 
is important enough to be held in common.  Any nation or group which 
accepts and obeys the norms of the 1954 Hague Convention accepts the 
presumptions that different cultures are subsets of a common human culture, 
that expressions of those cultures carry a basic intrinsic value, and 
consequently, should be preserved for as long as possible, regardless of armed 
                                                 
61 Parenthetically, it is important to define and address this perspective on customary international law 
as an alternative means of prosecuting the destruction of cultural heritage. For example, prior to its 2009 
ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention, the United States “acknowledg[ed] it as customary international 
law.” Posner, supra note 26, at 219. Customary international law (“CIL”) is “unwritten law to which nations 
may have (at most) only tacitly agreed.” DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND 
PRACTICE 146 (2015). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “customary law” as “[l]aw consisting of customs that 
are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; practices and beliefs that are so vital and 
intrinsic a part of a social and economic system that they are treated as if they were laws.” Customary Law, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
62 See Francioni, supra note 7, at 13. Despite the optimism of scholars like Francioni, even the use of 
sources of law like the 1954 Hague Convention as evidence of CIL—regardless of the complexity of actual 
practice—is the subject of ongoing disagreement. Furthermore, as this Comment discusses in this section, 
international laws governing the preservation of cultural property in armed conflict are notably inclined to 
rely on language reflecting a core belief in moral imperatives and the natural law tradition of early 
international law. See CHILDRESS ET AL., supra note 61, at 149 (tracing naturalist as opposed to positivist 
rationales for customary international law). Understandably, “the more that ‘naturalistic’ elements are 
admitted into the determination of customary international law, the more difficult and less objective the 
inquiry may appear.” Id. at 152. 
63 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 58, art. 5, ¶ 1. 
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conflict.  The situational validity of these presumptions is particularly 
precarious in times of civil war, cultural revolution, and governmental 
collapse.  
 
Under Article 2, “the protection of cultural property shall comprise the 
safeguarding of and respect for such property.”64  “Safeguarding,” as defined 
in Article 3, relates to peacetime duties to plan for “the foreseeable effects of 
an armed conflict”; that is, parties to the convention have an affirmative duty 
to prepare for the eventuality of conflict.65  “Respect,” outlined in Article 4, 
relates to mutual respect for a party’s own cultural property as well as its 
adversaries’ cultural property during armed conflict.66 
 
Article 4, section 2 contains the military necessity exception famously 
espoused by Eisenhower during World War II: the obligation of respect “may 
be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a 
waiver.”67  This exception was understandably the subject of considerable 
debate, and the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention (“Second 
Protocol”), crafted in the wake of the Balkan Wars, defines the limits of the 
military necessity exception for the destruction of cultural sites.68  It was 
“negotiated and adopted in order to reinforce the rather weak system of the 
Hague Convention” by limiting the military necessity exception.69  For 
example, Article 10 grants “enhanced protection” to cultural property 
designated as “cultural heritage of the greatest importance for humanity,”70 
while Article 13 provides that “[c]ultural property under enhanced protection 
shall only lose such protection . . . if, and for as long as, the property has, by 
its use, become a military objective.”71  Critics of the efficacy of the Second 
Protocol observe that it has been ratified by far fewer nations than the 1954 
Hague Convention, possibly because of its narrower military necessity 
exception.72 
 
                                                 
64 Id. art. 2. 
65 Id. art. 3; see also Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 348. 
66 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 58, art. 4, ¶ 1. 
67 Id. art. 4, ¶ 2. 
68 Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 351. Mali ratified the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 
1954 on November 15, 2012. Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries: Mali, supra note 56. 
69 Francioni, supra note 37, at 1217. 
70 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict art. 10, ¶ 1(a), Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/ 
images/0013/001306/130696eo.pdf. 
71 Id. art. 13, ¶ 1(b). 
72 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 26, at 216. 
 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 27 NO. 1 
 
330
However, the 1954 Hague Convention does not itself include 
provisions for prosecution or punishment, and so remains textually dependent 
on national domestic law for efficacy.73  Hence, although Mali was a party to 
the 1954 Hague Convention as of the 2012 conflict, there was little chance 
that it would serve as an effective deterrent, a guide for military engagement, 
or a guide to post-conflict criminal liability and prosecution because of the 
massive governmental collapse going on at the time within the country itself. 
 
C. The 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, also known as the World 
Heritage Convention 
 
Among the most prominent international responses to such World War 
II failures to prevent cultural destruction was the establishment of the United 
Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) in 
1945.74  The UNESCO Constitution reflects an understanding of cultural 
property that is held by humanity in common, and UNESCO was founded “to 
contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the 
nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal 
respect for justice, for the rule of law and for . . . human rights and 
fundamental freedoms . . . .”75  It considers the preservation of cultural 
property “a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual 
assistance and concern,”76 and it recognizes that there is a sense of a common 
human culture to be preserved despite the existence of national boundaries 
and inter- and intranational disputes. 
 
Under the 1972 World Heritage Convention, sites of “cultural heritage” 
are defined as monuments, buildings, or other sites “of outstanding universal 
value from the point of view of history, art or science . . . [or] from the 
historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.”77  The 
shift in phraseology from the 1954 Hague Convention on display here is 
particularly remarkable, as the international community faces a moment in 
                                                 
73 Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 349. 
74 Id. at 341; see also The Organization’s History, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/ 
about-us/who-we-are/history/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
75 UNESCO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 1. 
76 Id. pmbl. 
77 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 1, Nov. 16, 1972, 
1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/ 
Volume%201037/volume-1037-I-15511-English.pdf; see also What Is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”?, 
supra note 48. 
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which it must restructure key cultural heritage protections.  From “property of 
great importance to the cultural heritage of every people,”78 UNESCO 
narrows its site designation to include only those “of outstanding universal 
value.”79  The emphasis on an objective and universal historical and cultural 
narrative is of particular interest here, as ideological intranational conflicts 
often center on the ownership of and ability to control this type of narrative.  
While it may seem obvious, it is important to specify that UNESCO is 
premised on the notion that such a narrative is valuable to the international 
community as a whole. 
 
UNESCO and its officials emphasize this perspective in their public 
statements.  For example, Irina Bukova, the Director-General of UNESCO 
since 2009, has called the recent surge in attacks on cultural property “part . . . 
of the same global strategy of persecution and destruction, which seeks to tear 
at the fabric of society, to deny human rights and to quash the rule of law. . . . 
[W]e must win the battle of ideas . . . in order to prevent further radicalization” 
and to combat a “global strategy of hatred.”80  Bukova characterizes the World 
Heritage Convention as “consider[ing] attacks on cultural heritage as attacks 
on our shared identity.”81  It is because of this foundational premise that 
UNESCO is entitled to challenge the actions of groups functioning within 
sovereign nations like Mali. 
 
Mali is a member state of UNESCO,82 and the city of Timbuktu was 
designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1988.83  Situated south of the 
Sahara desert on the banks of the Niger River, the city was founded, likely as 
a Tuareg nomad camp, around 1100 CE and grew into an Islamic trade center 
for salt and gold in the fourteenth century.84  Between the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, it was a center of Islamic spiritual and intellectual life in 
Africa, and it was home to the University of Sankore and 180 Quranic 
                                                 
78 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 58, art. 1. 
79 World Heritage Convention, supra note 77, art. 1; see also What Is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”?, 
supra note 48. 
80 Irina Bukova, Ending Impunity for War Crimes on Cultural Heritage: The Mali Case, INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. TODAY: ARGUENDO (June 22, 2016), https://www.international-criminal-justice-today.org/arguendo/ 
ending-impunity-for-war-crimes-on-cultural-heritage-the-mali-case/. 
81 Id. 
82 Claiming Human Rights - in Mali, CLAIMING HUM. RTS., http://www.claiminghumanrights.org/ 
mali.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2010, 11:54 AM). 
83 Timbuktu, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Timbuktu-Mali (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
84 Id. 
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schools.85  It is also home to three historic mosques: the Djingareyber Mosque, 
rebuilt and enlarged in 1570–1583; the Sankore Mosque, restored in 
approximately 1578–1582; and the Sidi Yahia Mosque, restored in 
approximately 1577–1578, as well as “sixteen mausoleums and holy public 
places.”86  Under the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the 
World Heritage Convention, Timbuktu was selected for designation based on 
three discrete criteria: 
 
Criterion (ii): The mosques and holy places of Timbuktu have 
played an essential role in the spread of Islam in Africa at an 
early period. 
 
Criterion (iv): The three great mosques of Timbuktu, restored by 
the Qadi Al Aqib in the 16th century, bear witness to the golden 
age of the intellectual and spiritual capital at the end of the Askia 
dynasty. 
 
Criterion (v): The three mosques and mausoleums are 
outstanding witnesses to the urban establishment of Timbuktu, 
its important role of commercial, spiritual and cultural centre on 
the southern trans-Saharan trading route, and its traditional 
characteristic construction techniques.  Their environment has 
now become very vulnerable under the impact of irreversible 
change.87 
 
As earthen structures, the monuments of Timbuktu are vulnerable to natural 
deterioration and require regular maintenance, characteristics which kept it 
foremost in the minds of those observing and monitoring the status of World 
Heritage sites that may be classified as “in danger” even before armed conflict 
broke out.88  Sites like the Timbuktu monuments may be added to the List of 
World Heritage in Danger on the basis of either environmental threats—for 
example, an impending change in weather patterns that might cause wood to 
rot faster—or threats of destruction as a result of nearby armed conflict.89  In 
                                                 
85 Timbuktu, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CTR., http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/119 (last visited Nov. 
11, 2017). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
88 “The three mosques are stable but the mausoleums require maintenance, as they are fragile and 
vulnerable in the face of irreversible changes in the climate and urban fabric.” Id. 
89 World Heritage in Danger, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CTR., http://whc.unesco.org/en/158/ (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
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2012, “UNESCO immediately raised the issue of the destruction of the 
Mausoleums in Mali to the attention of the [ICC],” 90 even prior to Mali’s self-
referral to the ICC.91 
 
D. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
 
Finally, it was under the Rome Statute, which created the ICC, that Al 
Mahdi was charged and convicted of the war crime of cultural destruction.  
Unlike many other countries rich in immovable cultural heritage and 
struggling with intra- and international armed conflict—such as Iraq, Iran, 
Syria, and Libya—Mali is a party to the Rome Statute, having ratified it on 
August 16, 2000.92  Article 8 proscribes “[i]ntentionally directing attacks 
against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable 
purposes, [and] historic monuments . . . provided they are not military 
objectives.”93  As with other international legal provisions protecting 
immovable property, there remains an exception for actions of military 
necessity.  The Rome Statute is remarkable, however, in its extension of the 
law to reach crimes committed during intranational and not merely 
international conflicts.94 
 
Like General Eisenhower, the ICC draws a sharp distinction between 
war crimes that destroy lives and those that destroy culture, but that very 
distinction highlights tensions it is perhaps ill-equipped to address.  Despite 
the lofty mandates of the Lieber Code, victorious armies have often reserved 
the right to dictate the culture and beliefs of those they conquer.  It has been 
observed that international law protecting cultural property during armed 
conflict could be stronger, or at least better and more carefully enforced.  
                                                 
90 Bukova, supra note 80. 
91 A state may make a self-referral by invoking Article 14 about itself, rather than about another state 
party, as was probably first imagined when the Rome Statute was drafted. For a quick discussion of self-
referrals, see Patrick Wegner, Self-Referrals and Lack of Transparency at the ICC – The Case of Northern 
Uganda, JUST. CONFLICT (Oct. 4, 2011, 11:06 AM), https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/10/04/self-referrals-
and-lack-of-transparency-at-the-icc-–-the-case-of-northern-uganda/. For a more in-depth discussion, see 
Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the 
International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 403 (2005). 
92 States Parties to the Rome Statute: Mali, ICC, https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20 
parties/african%20states/Pages/mali.aspx (last updated Nov. 3, 2003). 
93 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, ¶ 2(b)(ix), (e)(iv), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute], http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pdf. Article 8 paragraph 
2(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute applies to international armed conflict, while paragraph 2(e)(iv) applies to non-
international armed conflict. See Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 346 n.32. 
94 CAROLINE EHLERT, PROSECUTING THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 170–71 (2014) (ebook). 
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However, the international organizations that devise and enforce it remain lax 
“because states are unwilling to trust international organizations to serve their 
interests.”95  Furthermore, laws protecting bodies rather than buildings are 
simply easier to understand as a reasonable international means of limiting 
power; even cooperative states adopt a “very cautious approach to constraints 
on their means of waging effective warfare.”96 
 
In Mali, international human rights observers and victims have accused 
all of the groups involved in the 2012 conflict of grave war crimes, including 
torture and murder.97  However, international actors, including France, the 
United States, and the European Union, have condemned only those 
committed by non-state actors.98  This situation arguably makes the ICC’s 
high-profile prosecution of cultural destruction ring somewhat hollow.99  Such 
optically lopsided condemnations threaten to deepen a fundamental mistrust 
of cultural property protections germane to the field for all states, but 
especially for groups attempting to enact sweeping cultural changes, as is the 
case for many of the extremist groups currently engaging in iconoclasm. 
 
III. CULTURAL DESTRUCTION IN TIMBUKTU AND THE AL MAHDI TRIAL 
 
A. Cultural Heritage in Timbuktu 
 
There are 333 Sufi saints buried in Timbuktu, and even during the 
unrest of 2012, city residents were accustomed to honoring the generations-
old practice of visiting the historic mausoleums of the saints and the gravesites 
of relatives on a regular basis to pray and to maintain the grounds.100  A Human 
Rights Watch report on the 2012 conflict quoted a Timbuktu resident 
explaining, “We pray to [the Sufi saints] for everything we look for in life,” 
and another resident saying, “After prayers [every week] we always visit the 
graves of our dead.  We clean the sand the winds have left. We pray for them. 
                                                 
95 Posner, supra note 26, at 219. 
96 Abtahi, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that “Geneva law, which protects war victims,” is much more 
developed than “Hague law, which regulates the ‘methods and means of conducting hostilities,’” due to this 
“very cautious approach”). 
97 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18, at 14. 
98 Id. at 12 (“While most of these actors criticized abuses by the Islamist groups, they were reluctant 
to publicly criticize those by the Malian army.”). 
99 See id. at 15; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the 
Law of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 793, 795 (2008) (“Double 
standards applied by governments and the lack of, or merely selective, enforcement by governments 
contributes to reciprocal non-compliance by non-state actors,” which in turn contributes to a “breakdown of 
the deterrent effect of [international humanitarian] law.”). 
100 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18, at 94. 
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For us it is a sign of respect and a reminder not to forget them or where we’ve 
come from.”101  A BBC News article quoted yet another resident emphasizing 
that local pride in the shrines stemmed from their being emblematic of 
Timbuktu’s Islamic heritage: “We are proud that Timbuktu was founded by 
Muslims.  It has never been a pagan city and our monuments are Muslim 
ones.”102 
 
Because these sites were integral to civilians’ daily lives and were also 
of considerable historical value, their destruction during the 2012 Malian 
conflict exemplifies one of the most serious challenges to the international 
protection of cultural property.  The World Heritage sites in Timbuktu were 
historically significant and recognized as such by the international 
community, but they also played a major role in residents’ traditional religious 
and cultural practices.  It is often tempting to separate rationales for the 
protection of property during armed conflict into the protection of property 
used by civilians and the protection of property of a more historical or cultural 
nature,103 but in communities like Timbuktu, that separation is impossible.  
The combined civilian and cultural value of the heritage sites in Timbuktu 
made for a particularly complicated collision between culturally hegemonic 
Salafi groups—attempting to bring about a rapid and radical cultural shift—
and the Sufi majority populace as well as the preservation-minded 
international community. 
 
B. Ansar Dine and the 2012–2013 Conflict in Mali 
 
In March of 2012, Malian military officers deposed President Amadou 
Toumani Toure, alleging he had failed to respond adequately to Tuareg104 rebel 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Ahmad Al-Faqi Al-Mahdi: The Vandal of Timbuktu, BBC NEWS, Sept. 27, 2016 [hereinafter Vandal 
of Timbuktu], http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37438360. 
103 See Frulli, supra note 12, at 204. 
104 The Tuareg are a primarily Muslim Berberian ethnic group in North Africa of about one million 
people living in independent federations in Algeria, Libya, Mali, and Niger. Tuareg, COUNTRIES & THEIR 
CULTURES, http://www.everyculture.com/wc/Mauritania-to-Nigeria/Tuareg.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
The Tuareg are considered ethnic minorities in the modern countries in which they live. Who Are the Tuareg?, 
SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM AFR. ART, https://africa.si.edu/exhibits/tuareg/who.html (last visited Nov. 4, 
2017). Currently, about 0.9% of the population of Mali is Tuareg. The World Factbook: Mali, CENT. 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/geos/ml.html (last updated Nov. 6, 2017). It should also be noted that although the Tuareg are 
Muslim, their religious beliefs consist of “a layering of Islamic tenets on earlier beliefs,” blending Islam with 
other cultural and religious traditions in the region. Tuareg, OXFORD REFERENCE, 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195309911.001.0001/acref-9780195309911-e-
937 (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). 
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groups attacking northern Malian towns.105  Those who led the coup 
subsequently also failed to defeat these groups.106  In April, the Tuareg 
organization National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (“MNLA”) 
and the Islamist group Ansar Dine merged and took control of Timbuktu,107 
and in May, joined by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (“AQIM”),108 they 
declared northern Mali an Islamic state.109  It was at this time that Ansar Dine 
imposed their interpretation of Islamic law in Timbuktu.110 
 
The full Arabic name of Ansar Dine is Harakat Ansar al-Dine, which 
means, “movement of defenders of the faith.”111  It is a Malian group led by 
Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Tuareg rebel, and its goal is to bring Mali under Islamic 
law.112  Like other Islamist groups in the area, they ascribe to the Salafi sect 
of Islam, whereas most Malians belong to the Sufi sect.113  The Salafi sect 
regards shrines like those in Timbuktu as idolatrous.114  The destruction of 
Sufi shrines has been a consistent feature of the actions of groups that rose to 
prominence during and in the wake of the “Arab Spring.”115  However, the 
conflict between these sects dates back centuries.116 
 
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi is a Tuareg scholar of Islam who was known 
for his introverted personality, his fluency in Arabic,117 his flawless 
memorization of the Quran,118 and his passion for a strict interpretation of 
                                                 
105 Mali Profile - Timeline, BBC NEWS, June 28, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
13881978. 
106 Mali Crisis: Key Players, supra note 13. 
107 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 18, at 104. 
108 Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 31 (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.pdf. 
109 Mali Profile - Timeline, supra note 105. 
110 Id. 
111 Mali Crisis: Key Players, supra note 13. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. It should be noted that all Abrahamic religions forbid idolatry, and iconoclasm is a unique feature 
of certain types of ideologically charged armed conflicts. For more on the rise of iconoclasm in certain 
interpretations of Islam, see Eleni Polymenopoulou, A Thousand Ways to Kiss the Earth: Artistic Freedom, 
Cultural Heritage and Islamic Extremism, 17 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 39, 49 (2015) (“Violent iconoclastic 
incidents may take place in the name of religions—yet, should not be mistakenly associated to them.”). 
115 Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 356. 
116 See Sufism and Salafism, Mali’s Deep Religious Divide, AFR. REP., Dec. 21, 2012, 7:12 PM, 
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Islamic law.119  Born in Agoune,120 a village located about 60 miles west of 
Timbuktu and from which jihadists are known to be recruited,121 he had also 
lived in Libya and Saudi Arabia, attended a Quranic college, and worked as a 
teacher in Mali prior to the conflict in 2012.122 
 
It is unclear why exactly Al Mahdi was attracted to Ansar Dine, but 
observers of the rise of jihadist groups in this region have pointed to 
commonplace, violent attacks by bandits stealing livestock from herdsmen 
living in villages like Agoune as a reason why the jihadists hold such sway in 
the area.123  In recent years, for example, the Malian government is thought to 
have failed to address the problem of lawlessness in the rural parts of northern 
Mali.124  Jihadist groups, according to some residents, “provide a better 
alternative to the state,” and although the groups’ responses have been brutal 
and violative of human rights, at least these responses arguably reduce the 
banditry that threatens herdsmen’s livelihoods.125 
 
When Ansar Dine and AQIM swept into Timbuktu in April of 2012, Al 
Mahdi assisted their administration as “an expert on matters of religion.”126  
In order to enforce their interpretation of Islamic law on the residents of 
Timbuktu, Ansar Dine and AQIM established “a local government, which 
included an Islamic tribunal, an Islamic police force, a media commission and 
a morality brigade . . . called the Hesbah.”127  Al Mahdi served as the leader 
of the Hesbah from April to September 2012.128  The Hesbah was charged 
with “repressing anything perceived by the occupiers to constitute a visible 
vice.”129  Some witnesses described Al Mahdi’s demeanor as that of a “town 
sheriff” who “present[ed] himself as the boss of all the city’s imams.”130 In 
addition to his crimes of cultural destruction, it appears likely from residents’ 
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statements131 that Al Mahdi led the Hesbah in punishing the citizens of 
Timbuktu for moral offenses132 such as smoking and drinking alcohol.133  In 
particular, human rights activists claim the Hesbah was complicit in Ansar 
Dine’s abuse of the women and girls of Timbuktu.134 
 
C. Al Mahdi and the Destruction of Timbuktu 
 
As leader of the Hesbah, Al Mahdi had been tasked with monitoring 
traditional prayer practices at the mausoleums that were in conflict with the 
beliefs of Ansar Dine and the type of law they sought to impose in 
Timbuktu.135  He met with local religious leaders and “explain[ed] on the radio 
what could and could not be done at the mausoleums.”136 However, in June 
and July of 2012,137 Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine, decided that the 
mausoleums and mosques in Timbuktu that Ansar Dine considered contrary 
to their religious beliefs must be destroyed.138  There was no question as to Al 
Mahdi’s role in orchestrating the destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums and 
mosques, but he also “recommended [to Ansar Dine leadership] not 
destroying the mausoleums so as to maintain relations between the population 
and the occupying groups.”139  However, it ultimately fell to Al Mahdi to carry 
out the instruction to destroy the sites.140 
 
On July 2, 2012,141 in front of the cameras of journalists,142 the Hesbah 
proceeded to systematically destroy nine mausoleums and the door of the Sidi 
Yahia Mosque.143  In video footage, members of Ansar Dine can be seen 
sitting atop the mausoleums, chipping away the fragile earthen structures with 
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poles and pickaxes, and using crowbars to pry apart the walls of the 
structures.144 They planned to destroy every Sufi shrine in Timbuktu.145 
 
As many observers have noted,146 the scene was eerily familiar: it 
recalled that of the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas147 by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in 2001.148  As at Bamiyan, the iconoclasm in Timbuktu was 
preceded and followed by urgent calls from UNESCO to stop the 
destruction.149  There, too, leaders ensured that the destruction was recorded 
by journalists who would spread the news of the Taliban’s defiance to the rest 
of the international community.150 
 
Ansar Dine seemed to emulate this style of defiant publicity in its own 
efforts.  As the mausoleums fell, Al Mahdi explained to a journalist, “The 
Prophet [Mohamed] said break apart these mausoleums because all people are 
equal and so in a cemetery no tomb must rise higher than another,” describing 
his role in the destruction as “justify[ing] all decisions made in the name of 
sharia, the name of the Quran.”151 During the destruction of the ancient door 
of the Sidi Yahia Mosque, Al Mahdi told journalists, “We fear that these 
myths [about the door] will invade the beliefs of people and the ignorant who, 
because of their ignorance and their distance from religion, will think that 
[these myths are] the truth.”152 
 
These justifications were not directly related to the conflict in which 
Ansar Dine was involved.  The invasion Al Mahdi was trying to prevent was 
an invasion of the minds of the residents of Timbuktu, not a physical invasion 
of the mosque or of the city.  Ansar Dine’s goal was not merely to take control 
of the city and the region while Mali’s official government crumbled, but to 
take control of the minds of its inhabitants.  When they smashed the 
mausoleums to rubble, they did so intending to smash the beliefs of the 
citizens of Timbuktu.  In the words of one journalist, “In destroying these 
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sacred places, the jihadists were launching an assault on the Sufi-influenced 
form of Islam practised in Timbuktu.”153  Reflecting later on the events of 
2012, the Malian Minister of Culture “described the destruction of the 
Timbuktu monuments as ‘an attack on what fuels our soul, on the very essence 
of our cultural values.  Their objective was to destroy our past, our culture, 
our identity, and in fact our dignity.’”154 
 
After Mali’s self-referral to the ICC, on July 1, 2012, ICC Chief 
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda “declared that the destruction of Sufi shrines in 
Timbuktu may constitute a war crime under the Rome Statute” and launched 
an official investigation.155  In January of 2013, the Malian government 
requested help from France to subdue the groups in the north, which were 
moving south.156  The French army recaptured Timbuktu by the end of the 
month,157 and in August of 2013, United Nations (“U.N.”) forces began to 
stabilize the north.158 
 
As a result of the 2012 conflict, 58,594 people remain internally 
displaced.159  These displaced persons include members of the judiciary and 
police, who have been slow to return to northern Mali.160  This delay has 
hindered the return of the rule of law and has possibly contributed to the 
ongoing prominence of jihadist groups in the area.161  According to post-
conflict reports from 2016, Malian villagers’ accounts of their interactions 
with jihadists differed as to whether they helped or hindered the armed theft 
of herdsmen’s cows and sheep, and as to whether they are sources of chaos or 
order.162  In contrast to its stern rebuke of the actions of Islamist militants in 
the country, the Malian authorities continue to be accused of “turn[ing] a blind 
eye” to violations of human rights allegedly perpetrated by the Malian armed 
forces.163  Many in Mali continue to crave justice.164 
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On September 18, 2015, a warrant was issued for Al Mahdi’s arrest,165 
and on September 26, 2015, Al Mahdi was apprehended by French troops in 
an arms-smuggling convoy in Niger166 and brought to The Hague to stand 
trial.167  Al Mahdi was charged with violating Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome 
Statute,168 which describes cultural destruction of this type as a war crime 
under the subheading of “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs 
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the 
established framework of international law.”169  Armed conflicts “not of an 
international character” are defined as those “that take place in the territory of 
a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.”170  In this 
context, Al Mahdi was specifically accused of violating Article 8(2)(e)(iv) by 
“[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion . . . 
[and] historic monuments, . . . provided they are not military objectives.”171 
 
It is important to remember that certain aspects of Al Mahdi’s trial and 
conviction indicate the ICC may have pursued this particular charge against 
him in order to reach other members of Ansar Dine guilty of war crimes 
against persons.172  As previously noted,173 although he was charged with a 
crime against property, there is some evidence of Al Mahdi’s involvement in 
other crimes against the citizens of Timbuktu during his time as the leader of 
the Hesbah.174  The charge he faced under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) carried a possible 
term of up to thirty years’ imprisonment.175  However, the prosecution 
recommended only nine to eleven years based on their agreement with Al 
Mahdi’s defense team.176  This plea agreement, which Al Mahdi and the 
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prosecution signed on February 18, 2016, prior to his trial, refers to Al 
Mahdi’s “cooperation with the Court” as a “mitigating circumstance[]” that 
the ICC may weigh in determining his sentence.177  The ICC was not bound 
by this agreement,178 but Al Mahdi’s ultimate sentence of nine years fell 
within its parameters.  It has been speculated that his prosecution for cultural 
destruction alone at this time is related to his possible cooperation in the 
apprehension and prosecution of others with whom he was associated in 
Timbuktu.179  This type of deal may become an important tool in an 
international strategy to prosecute non-state actors guilty of war crimes. 
 
Nevertheless, the trial itself put the crime of cultural destruction front 
and center.  In her opening statement at Al Mahdi’s trial, ICC Chief Prosecutor 
Fatou Bensouda emphasized the historic nature of the trial as well as the 
regrettably familiar facts of the case.180  Though also making note of Al 
Mahdi’s cooperation with the prosecution, she observed: 
 
Today’s trial is . . . all the more historic in view of the destructive 
rage that marks our times, in which humanity’s common heritage 
is subject to repeated and planned ravages by individuals and 
groups whose goal is to eradicate any representation of a world 
that differs from theirs by eliminating the physical 
manifestations that are at the heart of communities.181 
 
When Al Mahdi entered his guilty plea, he apologized and did not contest any 
aspect of the charges against him.  Dismissing his well-publicized 
justifications of his actions during the attack on the mausoleums, he conceded 
that he had acted in an objectively “evil” way, remarking, “We need to speak 
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justice even to ourselves.  We have to be truthful, even if it burns our own 
hands.”182 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Al Mahdi’s trial was the first application of Article 8(2)(e)(iv),183 a fact 
indicative of the difficulties the international community has encountered in 
its attempts to curtail cultural destruction, even in the face of a global 
epidemic.184  The current legal regime is ill-suited for conflicts with and 
among non-state actors because existing international law protecting cultural 
property in conflict zones was designed for a type of war which bears little 
resemblance to the major conflicts of recent years.  Non-state actors often 
attempt to establish themselves as permanent leaders in the places they invade 
during armed conflict and to bring about a change in the relationship between 
religion, the law, and the way residents live their lives.  These goals 
complicate the World War II-era notions of cultural preservation.  For the 
jihadists swept up in groups like Ansar Dine, the motivation to destroy World 
Heritage sites like those at Timbuktu may be more similar to that of civilians 
“in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union [as] they tore down the statues of . . . 
Lenin and Stalin.”185  Those who fight in modern contexts in which cultural 
property is at stake are unlikely to be deterred by a war crime statute wielded 
only against those who are unsuccessful in accomplishing widespread cultural 
revolution. 
 
The international community must strike a delicate balance between 
apathy and intrusive interventionism in order to effectively deter cultural 
destruction during times of civil unrest.  The Al Mahdi conviction stands as a 
stark reminder of the reasons why these crimes so frequently go unaddressed.  
As of late 2017, of the fifty-four sites currently included on the List of World 
Heritage in Danger, twenty-five are cultural heritage sites located in North 
Africa and the Middle East.186 
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However, the sequence of events in Mali exemplifies a certain kind of 
progress.  At the end of the day, a prominent perpetrator of culturally 
destructive war crimes against immovable cultural property was tried and 
convicted in the ICC in a display of the authority of cultural heritage laws on 
the world stage.  As the first guilty plea before the ICC,187 it will potentially 
be remembered as an important exemplar of the prosecution effectively using 
the cultural destruction charge to work with a defendant to gather evidence 
about war crimes committed by others at the same time.188  Al Mahdi’s 
cooperation will be crucial as the ICC continues its investigation of the 2012 
conflict and as Mali continues to pick up the pieces of a broken national 
identity.189  Although the Malian government forces that subdued the Islamist 
groups in the north engaged in their own torture and other human rights 
abuses, the government has failed to investigate or prosecute those war 
crimes,190 so the burden of enforcement may rest with an international 
community now familiar with the situation. 
 
Additionally, in August of 2017, the ICC issued a Reparations Order 
against Al Mahdi, ordering him to pay 2.7 million euros for his culturally 
destructive crimes in Timbuktu.191  Though Al Mahdi is indigent, a separate 
agency called the Trust Fund for Victims192 will match the award and prepare 
an implementation plan, a draft of which will be submitted to the court in 
2018.193  The order comes amid doubts that it can be effectively distributed, 
given the ongoing instability of northern Mali, and fears that such awards may 
incentivize future destruction.194 
 
In terms of furthering the deterrence of culturally destructive war 
crimes, the events in the aftermath of Al Mahdi’s arrest and subsequent trial 
are perhaps the most hopeful signs.  On April 25, 2013, the U.N. Security 
Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission in Mali (“MINUSMA”),195 a U.N. peacekeeping force 
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that, in 2015,196 was additionally “mandated to support the Malian authorities 
in protecting Mali’s cultural and historic sites from attacks.”197  Security 
Council Resolution 2227 specifically directs MINUSMA to “assist Malian 
authorities . . . in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in 
Mali.”198  Its efforts include a Quick Impact Project to rebuild Timbuktu’s 
manuscript libraries also destroyed during the 2012 conflict.199 
 
Although cultural artifacts once destroyed are gone forever, modern 
documentation and research efforts can lead restorative efforts to help 
communities heal.  In September of 2016, just days before Al Mahdi was 
convicted, citizens of Timbuktu gathered to unveil a restored version of the 
sacred gate of the Sidi Yahia mosque destroyed by the Hesbah in 2012.200  This 
was the culmination of a UNESCO rehabilitation effort commenced in 2013 
shortly after French forces retook the city.201  It involved the efforts of local 
carpenters and stonemasons using traditional methods to rebuild each 
mausoleum destroyed by Ansar Dine.202  At a 2016 consecration ceremony for 
the rebuilt mausoleums, Almamy Koureissi, a spokesperson for the Minister 
of Culture, Handicrafts and Tourism of Mali, observed, “Culture is at the heart 
of government action because we have found our bearings, our cultural values.  
We need to embrace our moral center, to remain standing, open to the world, 
welcoming and hospitable in accordance with our legendary traditions.”203 
 
Furthermore, in November of 2016, UNESCO hosted a workshop at the 
National Museum of Mali in Bamako to train thirty representatives of Malian 
armed forces in the preservation of cultural heritage during armed conflict.204  
The workshop represented an important step for the U.N. in providing 
resources for member states to “familiarize them with the tools at their 
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disposal for ensuring protection of citizens and cultural property.”205  Similar 
man-made disasters have in the past led to greater visibility and protection of 
cultural property,206 and there is reason to believe that the destruction in 
Timbuktu and the Al Mahdi conviction will do the same in Mali.207  That 
visibility may continue to be vital in the near future—there are reports that a 
new Islamist group, also related to AQIM, called the Macina Liberation Front, 
has begun attacking Malian politicians and military.208  The Malian Army 
continues to be accused of human rights abuses as it fights back.209 
 
The rise of iconoclasm and resulting World Heritage losses, from 
Bamiyan to Timbuktu, have also mobilized international efforts to contribute 
to better documentation of attacks on threatened sites.  For example, 
Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa (“EAMENA”) 
uses satellite imagery to compile a spatial database that can provide risk 
assessment information to heritage professionals.210  In the words of 
EAMENA, “Not all damage and threats to the archaeology can be prevented, 
but they can be mitigated”211 by its efforts “to create an accessible body of 
data . . . to target those sites most in danger and better plan and implement the 
preservation and protection of this heritage.”212 
 
These forms of international outreach and cooperation hold some 
promise to clarify the rationale and scope of international laws protecting 
cultural heritage even in regions undergoing major sociopolitical upheaval.  
While Al Mahdi’s conviction is a step in the right direction, the specific 
factors in place that made his prosecution possible—especially Mali’s 
ratification of certain key international conventions and the Rome Statute—
are unique and unlikely to lead to relief for other civilian communities 
suffering similar atrocities.  Although the fundamental logic of cultural 
heritage has been something of an unwritten norm for centuries, in practice, it 
has been frequently violated in favor of military expediency, and “impunity, 
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rather than accountability, has been the norm.”213  The cosmopolitan 
philosophy of collective ownership of cultural treasures can be cast as a 
conqueror’s philosophy; a philosophy which holds those cultural treasures at 
arm’s length, and is likely to seem irrelevant and self-interested to those 
instigating radical ideological change in the states that hold them.  The 
fundamental assumptions at the heart of the international protection of cultural 
heritage must evolve alongside the evolution of the rules of armed conflict in 
order to better reflect the realities of modern threats.  In the words of ICC 
Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, when it comes to the destruction of cultural 
heritage, “[h]istory will not be generous to our failure to care.”214 
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